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Race Equality by Statute
Enactment of the recent "Equal Rights Bill" 1 by the Pennsylvania
legislature serves to focus the legal spotlight upon a legislative and judicial
problem of great practical importance. Although the hubbub engendered by
this latest addition to the statute books might suggest that it is a novel question, the contrary is true. Pennsylvania itself has had a similar statute since
1887,2 and while a federal "Civil Rights Bill" 3 was found fatally defective
under the Constitution, 4 the state lawmaking agencies have produced like
statutes in at least eighteen jurisdictions. 5 Longer than its predecessors, the
new Pennsylvania bill raises certain old problems in addition to some of its
own.
Typical of the statutes in other jurisdictions is that in force in Indiana: 6
"All persons within the jurisdiction of said state shall be entitled
to the full and equal enjoyment of the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges of inns, restaurants, eating houses, barber shops,
public conveyances on land and water, theaters and all other places of
public accommodations and amusements, subject only to the conditions
and limitations established by law and applicable alike to all citizens.
"Any person who shall violate any of the provisions of the foregoing section by denying to any citizen, except for reasons applicable
alike to all citizens of every race and color, and regardless of color or
race, the full enjoyment of any of the accommodations, advantages,
facilities, or privileges in said section enumerated, or by aiding or inciting such denial, shall, for every such offense, forfeit and pay a sum
not to exceed one hundred dollars to any person aggrieved thereby, to
be recovered in any court of competent jurisdiction in the county where
said offense was committed, and shall also, for every such offense, be
deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and, upon conviction thereof, shall
be fined not to exceed one hundred dollars, or shall be imprisoned not
more than thirty days, or both. And provided, further, that a judgI. Acts General Assembly No. 132, June I1, 1935.
(Purdon, 193o) tit. 18, § 1211 (1887).

2. PA. STAT. ANN.

3. 18 STAT.335 (1875).
4. Civil Rights Cases, I09 U. S. 3 (883).
5. CAI. CIV. CODE (Deering, 1931) §§ 51, 52, 53 (1923) ; CoLo. STAT. ANN. (Courtright,
1926) §§ 754a, 754b (i895); CONN. GEN. STAT. (Cum. Supp. 1933) § 116ob (933); ILL.
104, 105 (1911); IND. STAT. ANN. (Baldwin, 1934)
REv. STAT. (Cahill, 1933) c. 38, 111
§§4763, 4764 (i885); IOW-A CODE (931) §§ 13251, 13252 (1897); KIAN. REV. STAT. ANw.
(1923) §§ 21-2424, 21-2425 (1874); MASs. ANN. LA.ws (1934 Cum. Supp.) vol. 9, c. 272,
§ 98 (1934); MICH. Comp. LAws (Mason's 1933 Supp.) §§ 17115-146, 17115-147 (93i);
MINN. STAT. (Mason, 1927) § 7321; NEB. Comp. STAT. (1929) §§ 23-101, 23-102 (1893);
N. J. COmP. STAT. (Cum. Supp. 1911-1924) §§ 39-I, 39-2 (I92I) ; N. Y. CONS. LAWs ANN.

(McKinney's Supp. 1935) tit. 8,

§§ 40, 41 (1913) ; OHIO CODE ANN. (Throckmorton's Bald-

win 1930) §§ 12940-12942; Pennsylvania (mtpra note I) ; R I. Acts and Resolves 1925,
(Remington, 1932) §:2686 (igog); Wis. STAT. (1931)
(i93I). Many of these statutes represent amendments of earlier versions.
6. IND. STAT. ANN. (Baldwin, 1934) §§ 4763, 4764 (1885).
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ment in favor of the party aggrieved, or punishment or committal upon
an indictment, affidavit, or information, shall be a bar to further or
other prosecution or suit."
The older Pennsylvania act was unusually brief:
"Any person, company, corporation, being owner, lessee or manager of any restaurant, hotel, railroad, street railway, omnibus line,
theatre, concert, hall or place of entertainment, or amusement, who
shall refuse to accommodate, convey or admit any person or persons on
account of race or color over their lines, or into their hotel, or restaurant, theatre, concert, hall or place of amusement, shall, upon conviction
thereof, be guilty of a misdemeanor, and be punished by a fine not less
than fifty dollars nor more than one hundred dollars."
The new act, like the old, is entitled, "An act to provide civil rights for
all people, regardless of race or color", is said to be for the purpose of "amplifying and extending the provisions" of the old act, and continues as follows:
"All persons within the jurisdiction of this Commonwealth shall
be entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities,
and privileges of any places of public accommodation, resort, or amusement, subject only to the conditions and limitations established by law
and applicable alike to all persons. No person being the owner, lessee,
proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent, or employe of any such
place, shall directly or indirectly refuse, withhold from, or deny to, any
person, any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges
thereof, or directly or indirectly publish, circulate, issue, display, post
or mail any written or printed communication, notice or advertisement
to the effect that any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities, and
privileges of any such places, shall be refused, withheld from, or denied
to, any person on account of race, creed, or color, or that the patronage
or custom thereat of any person belonging to, or purporting to be of,
any particular race, creed or color is unwelcome, objectionable or not
acceptable, desired or solicited. The production of any such written
or printed communication, notice or advertisement, purporting to relate
to any such place and to be made by any person being the owner, lessee,
proprietor, superintendent, or manager thereof, shall be presumptive
evidence in any civil or criminal action that the same was authorized
by such person. A place of public accommodation, resort or amusement,
within the meaning of this article, shall be deemed to include inns, taverns, roadhouses, hotels, whether conducted for the entertainment of
transient guests, or for the accommodation of those seeking health, recreation or rest, or restaurants or eating houses, or any place where food
is sold for consumption on the premises, buffets, saloons, barrooms, or
any store, park, or inclosure where spirituous or malt liquors are sold,
ice cream parlors, confectioneries, soda fountains, and all stores where
ice cream, ice and fruit preparations, or their derivatives, or where beverages of any kind, are retailed for consumption on the premises, drug
stores, dispensaries, clinics, hospitals, bathhouses, theatres, motion picture houses, airdromes, roof gardens, music halls, race courses, skating
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rinks, amusement and recreation parks, fairs, bowling alleys, gymnasiums, shooting galleries, billiard and pool parlors, public libraries, kindergartens, primary and secondary schools, high schools, academies,
colleges and universities, extension courses, and all educational institutions under the supervision of this Commonwealth, garages and all
public conveyances operated on land or water, as well as the stations
and terminals thereof. Nothing herein contained shall be construed to
include any institution, club or place or places of public accommodation,
resort or amusement, which is or are in its or their nature distinctly
private, or to prohibit the mailing of a private communication in writing sent in response to a specific written inquiry.
"Any person who shall violate any of the provisions of this act or
who shall aid or incite the violation of any said provisions shall for each
and every violation thereof be fined not less than one hundred dollars
nor more than five hundred dollars, or shall be imprisoned for a period
of not less than thirty days nor more than ninety days, or, in the discretion of the Court, both such fine and imprisonment may be imposed."
The act was signed by the Governor on the iith of June, 1935, and
took effect September Ist.
Statutes of this sort began appearing shortly after the Civil War, the
enthusiasm of the movement climaxing in the passage of the federal statute
of I875. 7 This act provided for "full and equal enjoyment" of the accommodations of inns, public conveyances, theatres and "other places of public
amusement." Reasons for denial of accommodations were required to be
those applicable to all citizens, of every race and color. Heavy penalities
were exacted for non-compliance: $5oo to go to the aggrieved party, plus
a fine of $500 to $IOOO, or thirty days to one year imprisonment. Applicable
to all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States, this act bid fair
to eliminate the need for legislation among the states. In 1883 the act was
declared unconstitutional in the Civil Rights Cases." It was argued that
authority for such legislation was contained in that portion of the Fourteenth Amendment providing against state abridgement of privileges and
immunities, deprivation of liberty, or denial of equal protection of the laws.
It was answered, correctly it seems, that this amendment gave the federal
government power to bar only state interference, and not to regulate discriminatory conduct on the part of citizens. An attempt was also made to
bring the legislation under the Thirteenth Amendment, prohibiting slavery
or involuntary servitude except as a punishment for crime. To the argument that discrimination in effect pinned upon negroes the badge of servitude, the Court replied that such denial could not be brought within the terms
"slavery" or "involuntary servitude" without an unconscionable stretching.
Justice Harlan entered a lengthy dissent to Justice Bradley's majority opinion on both these points, evidencing a willingness to extend both amendments with a free hand in order to effectuate what he believed to be a salutary policy. Although the Court did not pass on the question of discrimination in conveyances in interstate commerce, nor in amusement places in the
7. For a full treatment of the early history of civil rights legislation, see Stephenson,
Race Distinctions in Amwrican Law (19op) 43 Am. L. REv. 547.
8. IO9 U. S. 3 (1883).
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District of Columbia or the territories, the holding effectually quashed any
hopes for a general statutory attempt by Congress to solve the problem. The
decision called forth a revival of activity in the state legislatures, and
numerous statutes appeared within the next few years.
The constitutionality of the state acts has been attacked on different
grounds, and with complete lack of success. Proprietors who believe that
their trade is menaced by the necessity of catering to a racially mixed clientele may be expected to have raised the familiar outcry of "due process."
They have done so, but on this score they have met with uniform frustration. Places of public accommodation and amusement are deemed to come
within the scope of the states' police power for regulatory purposes, and
combatting racial prejudice is considered a reasonable objective. That property is taken when and if business wanes, and that freedom of contract is
mitigated, cannot of course be denied, but the weight of judicial pronouncement that due process is not violated fairly precludes any serious question
as to the validity of the new Pennsylvania act on this count. Civil rights
bills have been upheld by the Pennsylvania courts, 9 by thehighest tribunals
in numerous other states, 10 and by the United States Supreme Court. 1' Another possible ground of attack lies in the frequent constitutional prohibition
of excessive penalties. 1 2 The general statement has been made that penalties will be held invalid when they are so heavy as to frighten off those
who might otherwise be willing to risk violation of the statute and test its
constitutionality.' 3 While a plausible argument might be framed to the
effect that the penalties imposed by the new act are disproportionate to the
offense, the chances of its success are not good. Several statutes have heavier
penalties,' 4 and the decisions indicate no instance of the argument being
raised at all, much less triumphantly. A court inimical to the act might, on
the other hand, seize upon such a ground for invalidating it, as an easy way
out of the difficulties attendant upon such a result. Since the nature of the
offense must be weighed separately in each instance, prior case authority
involving other crimes would not be seriously binding. Any considered
forecast of the constitutional fate of the new act must recognize, however,
that it will probably be upheld.
Assuming the statutes to be constitutional, there is a large question as
to their efficacy in securing the rights they purport to grant. It is at least
clear that at common law, discrimination was unchecked in most of the
establishments named in the statutes. For example, in this country a ticket
to a theatre was considered only a revocable license, and although the proprietor was under a contract duty once the sale was made, exclusion gave
the ticket holder only a right to the limited damages arising from breach
9.Commonwealth v. George, 61 Pa. Super. 412 (9,5).
Io. Pickett v. Kuchan, 323 Ill. 138, 153 N. E. 667 (1926) ; Ferguson v. Gies, 82 Mich.
358, 46 N. W. 718 (189o); People v. King, Iio N. Y. 418, 18 N. E. 245 (888); and further
cases collected in Note (1927) 49 A. L. R. 505.
ii. Western Turf Assn. v. Greenberg, 204 U. S. 359 (9o7).
12. E. g., U. S. CONST. Amend. VIII; MAss. Coi-sT. pt. I, art. XXVI; N. Y. CONST.
art. I, § 5; PA. CONST. art. I, § 13.
13. See Ex parte Young, 209 U. S. 123, 147 (igo7) ; Amos v. Gunn, 84 Fla. 285, 363, 94
So. 6,5, 641 (1922).

14. See infra p. 79.
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of contract. 15 Disappointment and humiliation could not be compensated
in damages.'
Carriers and innkeepers were, of course, under stricter duties,
being required to accept all unobjectionable comers,' 7 but even in those instances the sanction behind the rule was not entirely effective. It is true
that carriers have been held liable in damages for humiliation, upon excluding patrons,' 8 and while a clear cut case involving damages for humiliation
alone has not been found as to innkeepers, their liability is admittedly tortious and not limited to contract measure of damages.' 9 Nevertheless, white
juries are unlikely to extend generous awards to colored plaintiffs in such
cases, and the "rights" recognized at common law were all too likely to become largely theoretical.
The sanctions set up in the statutes vary in degree and form. On the
criminal side, discrimination is generally made a misdemeanor. 20 Fines and
imprisonment, or both, are commonly specified. There is ordinarily a minimum fine stated, but in some instances it is extremely small, 2 ' some states
provide for no minimum, 22 and some for no fines at all. 23 None have minimums higher than $ioo, and the maximums range generally from $IOO to
$500.24 Kansas is unique with a maximum of $iooo and a minimum of
25
Possible periods of imprisonment are as high as one year,
only $io.
while some states have no minimum period 26 and others specify thirty days
28
Most
as the lowest limit. 27 In some states no imprisonment is provided.
of the statutes allow the imposition of both these penalties at the court's
discretion. In New Jersey violators are required to turn over $IOO to $500
to the state in an action of debt, in addition to the fine and jail term. A
number of the acts insure something more than moral satisfaction to the
aggrieved by specifying that cash sums be turned over to him, in addition to
the criminal provisions noted above.2 9 New York and Massachusetts lead
in this respect with minimums of $ioo, maximums of $5oo. In all of these
states the specified sum must be secured by bringing suit in a competent
15. Marrone v. Washington Jockey Club, 227 U. S. 633 (1913) ; De La Ysla v. Publix

Theatres Corp., 82 Utah 598, 26 P. (2d) 8I8 (933) ; see 2 Cooixm, TORTS (4th ed. 1932)
§250; 2 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY (2d ed. 192o) § 349 (d).
16. Taylor v. Cohn, 47 Ore. 538, 84 Pac. 388 (1go6) ; see i SuTHERLAND, DAMAGES (4th

ed. igi6) § 95.

17. Messenger v. Penna. R. R., 37 N. J. L. 531 (1874) ; Willis v. McMahan, 89 Cal. 156,
26 Pac. 649 (1891) ; see BEAI, INNKEEPERS AND HoTELs (1go6) §§ 55, 61.
18. Cleveland R. Co. v. Kinsley, 27 Ind. App. 135, 6o N. E. 169 (19Ol) ; Runyan v. Central R. R. of New Jersey, 65 N. J.L. 228, 47 Atl. 422 (i9oo) ; see 3 SUTHERLAND, DAMAGES (4th ed. 1916) § 936, P. 3446.
ig. Atwater v. Sawyer, 76 Me. 539 (1884) ; see Mateer v. Brown, i Cal.

221, 230

(85o);

HoTELs (igo6) c. VI.
20. In Colorado, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Michigan, Minnesota ("gross misdemeanor"), Nebraska, New Jersey, New York and Washington.
BEA2. INNKEEPERS AND

21. Colorado ($Io), Kansas ($io), Nebraska ($25).

Connecticut, Indiana, Iowa, Massachusetts, Wisconsin.
California, Michigan, Minnesota, Rhode Island, Washington.
24. A $5o0 maximum is specified in Illinois, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, and Pennsylvania.
22.
23.

25.

In Colorado, Illinois, and Massachusetts.

26. Colorado, Connecticut, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Massachusetts, New Jersey, Wisconsin.
27. New York, Ohio, and Pennsylvania.
28. California, Kansas, Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska, Rhode Island, Washington.
29. California, Colorado, Illinois, Indiana, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New York, Ohio,
Wisconsin.
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court. New Jersey allows the aggrieved to sue in the name of the state to
recover his costs and attorney's fees. Some acts require that the aggrieved
person choose between civil recovery and enforcement of the criminal provisions. 30
A serious question of interpretation arises under a few of the statutes,
including the new Pennsylvania act. These make no provision at all for
civil liability, merely setting out criminal penalties. 31 While it has been
held that the passage of a civil rights bill did not disturb the privilege of
bringing a common law action against an innkeeper, 32 it might be argued
that civil suits are not available against amusement proprietors unless the
statute grants such a right. Nevertheless, it has been decided in Michigan 33
and Washington 34 that civil suits for damages might be maintained although
the statutes were silent on the question. These holdings may or may not
be followed in Pennsylvania, where the situation is deeply befogged. In
Commonwealth v. George,3 5 which involved a criminal prosecution under
the old act, Judge Kephart specifically noted the uncertainty concerning civil
suits, declining to express any conclusion on the question by way of dictum.3 6
In the new act there are instances of wording which suggest, at least, that
the legislators had civil suits in mind. The act prohibits the use of any
written or printed matter stating an intention to discriminate, or expressing
an objection to colored patronage. It then states that the production of
such matter, purporting to be made by "or on behalf of any proprietor, shall
be presumptive evidence that he authorized its use, "in any civil or criminal
action." The reference to civil actions, unless attributable to mere inadvertence, seems to be highly relevant. Another possible argument lies in a
change from the wording of the old act, which simply stated that any person refusing accommodations should be guilty of a misdemeanor punishable
by fine. The new act opens with the statement that "all persons . . . shall
be entitled to the full and equal accommodations. . ." It seems plausible to
argue that the new act grants affirmative rights against discrimination more
explicitly than the old, and that these rights, though acquired by statute, may
be civilly enforced. The strongest argument against civil suits is the very
fact that the new act makes no mention of them in a clear fashion. Strikingly similar to the New York and New Jersey acts, it is significant that the
act contains no provision for payments to the aggrieved party as do those
statutes, since in most other respects the preceding acts were scrupulously
duplicated. Whichever way the question is decided, there is little to be said
for draftsmanship that casts only uncertainties upon an issue which should
have been clarified.
Aside from criminal and civil liability there is no case authority for
added means of enforcing these statutory rights. If juries consistently refuse to convict or to grant substantial damages, injunctive relief from discrimination might be thought desirable. It has been sought in one case under
the Illinois act, but the court without hesitation dismissed the bill in view of
30. Colorado, Illinois, Indiana, Ohio, Wisconsin.
31. Michigan, Nebraska, Rhode Island, Washington.
32. Cornell v. Huber, 102 App. Div. 293, 92 N. Y. Supp. 434 (2d Dep't, 19o5).
33.
34.
35.
36.

Bolden v. Grand Rapids Operating Corp., 239 Mich. 318, 214 N. W. 241 (1927).
Anderson v. Pantages Theater Co., 114 Wash. 24, 194 Pac. 813 (921).
61 Pa. Super. 412 (915).
Id. at 418, 419.
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the existing civil and criminal means of enforcement. 3 7

It is unlikely that

any court would extend the scope of "inadequacy of the remedy at law" to
include a situation where the only insufficiency consisted of a hostile jury.
And it is only in unusual cases of persistent discrimination that injunctive
relief is likely to be considered at all.
Another matter, probably sufficiently self-evident, should be noted in
passing. The acts prohibit exclusion only on grounds of race, creed, or color.
They in no way detract from a proprietor's privilege of excluding or ejecting persons of any race who conduct themselves in an objectionable manner.
As may have been expected, there has been considerable controversy
as to the places covered by these statutes. Certain standard provisions remove from the field of possible doubt "conveyances on land and water",
theatres, restaurants and inns. Barber shops are mentioned by name in
many statutes, as are bathhouses and skating rinks. In New Jersey, New
York, and Pennsylvania, a large number of places are specified. The questions of interpretation arise, of course, over places not specifically named.
There has been litigation over bootblack stands, 38 saloons, 39 dance halls,40
beauty parlors 41 and soda fountains. 42 Courts readily apply the dogma
that penal statutes are to be strictly construed, 43 and the same is true of
those in derogation of the common law. When general phrases, such as
"places of public accommodation", are followed by enumeration of specific
places, the general terms are of course limited by the latter list. Many
statutes, after enumerating specific places, add the phrase, "and all other
places of public accommodation

.

.

."

Even in such a situation it has been

held that this general phrase was to include only the same type of place as
those specifically mentioned. 44 In one case, however, it was held that this
37. White v. Pasfield, 212 IIl. App. 73 (i918).
38. Darius v. Apostolos, 68 Colo. 323, 19o Pac. 5i0 (920)

(held within act under term

"other places o.f public accommodation"); Burks v. Bosso, i8o N. Y. 34i, 73 N. E. 58
(i9o5) (held not covered by "other places

.

.

."

phrase, due to lack of similarity to places

previously named in act).
39. Rhone v. Loomis, 74 Minn. 2oo, 77 N. W. 31 (i898) (not covered by term "other
places of . . . refreshment, accommodation, or entertainment"; quite possibly a deliberate
omission due to likelihood of riots) ; Kellar v. Koerber, 61 Ohio St. 388, 55 N. E. ioo2
(1899) (saloon not a place of public accommodation; public policy against drinking should
be furthered). In New York, the Court of Appeals reversed lower court holdings and held
saloons not places of public accommodation. Gibbs v. Arras Bros., 222 N. Y. 332, iis N. E.
857 (1918) (three judges dissenting). The statute was amended shortly thereafter and now
includes specific mention of saloons. The same is true of the present Minnesota statute. See
supra note 5 for citations.
40. Johnson v. Auburn & Syracuse Ry., 169 App. Div. 864, i56 N. Y. Supp. 93 (4th
Dep't, 1915) (not covered by "all other places

. . ." term).

The case was reversed in 222

N. Y. 443, u9 N. E. 72 (i918) but principally on the ground thai the dance hall was an
auxiliary to a trolley line, concededly within the statute as a public conveyance. In Youngstown Park and Falls Street Ry. v. Tokus, 4 Ohio App. 276 (915) a dance hall was held
covered by the term "and all other places of public accommodation or amusement."
41. Campbell v. Eichert, 155 Misc. 164, 278 N. Y. Supp. 946 (Sup. Ct. i935) (not a
place of public accommodation under statute).
42. Cecil v. Green, i6i Ill. 265, 43 N. E. 1105 (i896) (not a place of public accommodation under the act) ; Goff v. Savage, 122 Wash. 194, 2io Pac. 374 (1922) (same).
43. Chochos v. Burden, 74 Ind. App. 242, 128 N. E. 696 (192o) (ice cream parlor not
covered by act) ; Brown v. Bell Co., 146 Iowa 89, 123 N. W. 231 (I9o9) (booth at Pure
Food show not covered by act) ; Goff v. Savage, 122 Wash. 194, 210 Pac. 374 (1922) (same
as to soda fountain).
44. Cecil v. Green, 16i Ill. 265, 43 N. E. iio5/ (i89) ; Brown v. Bell Co., 146 Iowa 89,
123 N. W. 231 (igo); Gibbs v. Arras Bros., 222 N. Y. 332, II8 N. E. 857 (i918).
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doctrine of ejusdem generis was inapplicable since the enumerated places
were of so diversified a character as to have no common characteristic. 45
The new Pennsylvania act does not include the phrase "and all other
places . . ." This makes doubly significant the omission of at least two
prominent types of amusement place in the lengthy tabulation of what the
term "place of public accommodation . . ." is to be "deemed to include."
Swimming pools and dance halls are the notable omissions, too important
to admit of suggestions that the failure to include them was due to oversight. It is worthy of note that these places are not specifically mentioned
have been held included under the
in any of the acts, and while dance halls
"and all other places . . ." clause, 46 an opposite result has been reached
even under such a clause. 47 The court in the latter case pointed out that
the omission of such a place may well have been deliberate, due to the increased element of physical proximity attached to that type of amusement
place. No reported cases have been found passing on the question of swimming pools, though exclusion from bathhouses at a beach would come under
the specific ban of most of the statutes. It seems safe to predict that pools
and dancing establishments will not be held answerable to the new Pennsylvania bill, unless the above principles are completely disregarded.
The new Pennsylvania act borrows from its New York and New Jersey predecessors one clause of notable obscurity in meaning: "Nothing
herein contained shall be construed to include any institution, club, or place
or places of public accommodation, resort, or amusement, which is or are in
its or their nature distinctly private . . ." What is meant by "clubs" and
"institutions" of private character is relatively clear. This would appear
to include organizations having, for example, a fixed membership, with
monthly or yearly dues, as contrasted with establishments charging admission in the orthodox fashion. Even as to those terms close questions may
of course arise. But it is by no means clear what is meant by the additional
mention of "places of public accommodation . . . distinctly private . . ."
There seems to be a contradiction in terms. It is quite conceivable that
there will be a widespread formation of "clubs" to take advantage of this
clause, and it will be interesting to see to what extent the courts will sweep
aside such devices of this sort as appear to be no more than camouflage. It
has even been suggested that this provision in the new Pennsylvania act delimits the entire statute to places conducted by the state or municipality, since
all those "distinctly private" are exempt. 47a This interpretation appears to
require small consideration, but the fact remains that the true meaning of the
clause is thoroughly hidden, perhaps non-existent.
An important practical matter concerns the legality of providing separate, but equal, acommodations in theaters and the like. It has been held
that refusal to seat a negro in the seat to which his ticket entitled him, is
violative of the civil rights act, although he was offered seating in a different
section of the house. 48 Since acquisition of a ticket merely adds a contract
45. Darius v. Apostolos, 68 Coo. 323, 19o Pac. 51o (1920).
46. Youngstown Park and Falls Street Ry. v. Tokus, 4 Ohio App. 276 (1915).
47. Johnson v. Auburn & Syracuse Ry., 169 App. Div. 864, 156 N. Y. Supp. 93 ( 4 th
Dep't, 1915). See supra note 40 for later history of this case.
47a. See pamphlet "Equal Rights Law", published by Pa. State Hotel Assn. (1935) at 4.
48. Joyner v. Moore-Wiggins Co., 152 App. Div. 266, 136 N. Y. Supp. 578 (4th Dep't,
1912) ; Anderson v. Pantages Theater Co., 114 Wash. 24, 194 Pac. 813 (1921).
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right to the patron's legal standing, it would appear to follow that restricting negroes to a particular section is illegal irrespective of whether the complaining party had secured a ticket calling for a particular seat. It has been
so decided. 49 The theory appears to be that having a portion of the theatre
open to whites and not to negroes, constitutes discrimination. This may
be true if the whites are allowed seats in any portion of the theatre, but it is
open to serious question in case negroes have a section from which whites
are excluded and which is fully as adequate as other sections. In such a case
both races are treated equally. This point does not appear to have been
pressed in the cases, however. The difficulty with such an argument is that
separate accommodations in a theatre are seldom in fact equal. Seats on one
side are on the whole less desirable than those in the center, and balcony
accommodations cannot accurately be termed the equivalent of downstairs
seats. In a New York case it was held proper for the lower court to exclude
evidence that many persons preferred balcony seats, 50 and this seems a
commendably realistic view. As in other instances, the Pennsylvania position here is unclear. In Commonwealth v. George,51 the Superior Court
reversed the trial court for not leaving it to the jury to find whether limiting
negroes to balcony seats was not a sufficient compliance with the statute.
But it will be noted that the old act prohibited only refusal of accommodations; no mention was made of "full and equal" accommodations. Seating
in a balcony is unquestionably "accommodation", but it by no means follows
that it will suffice under the new act, which requires equality of accommodation. This is perhaps the gravest question arising under the new act, and
there appears to be better than an even chance that segregation of negroes
in balconies will be held no longer lawful.
Two New York cases present an interesting diversion from the orthodox type of question arising under the statutes. In Matthews v. Hotz,5 2 it
was held that a white man who had been charged exorbitant prices in a
saloon because he was accompanied by a negro had no ground for complaint
under the civil rights act, since the discrimination was due not to his buf to
his companion's color. In Cohn v. Goldgraben,53 the court became impaled
upon the horns of a dilemma. The white plaintiff was denied service in a
colored restaurant because he was with a negro companion and the establishment had a rule against serving racially mixed parties at the same table.
The majority of the court held that there was no violation of the civil rights
bill, since the refusal was due not solely to the plaintiff's color, but to that
coupled with the color of his companion. A dissenting opinion was entered,
urging that the plaintiff's color had been the real reason for the denial of
accommodation-had he been a negro, he would have been served, since the
party would not then have been mixed. These decisions are, of course,
more interesting than significant.
49. Jones v. Kehrlein, 49 Cal. App. 646, 194 Pac. 55 (192o) ; Guy v. Tri-State Amusement Co., 7 Ohio App. 509 (1917). Separate accommodation in restaurants has also been

held an insufficient compliance with the act. Ferguson v. Gies, 82 Mich. 358, 46 N. W. 718
(1890).
50. Joyner v. Moore-Wiggins Co., 152 App. Div. 266, 136 N. Y. Supp. 578 (4th Dep't,
1912).

5I. 6i Pa. Super. 412 (915).
52. i73 N. Y. Supp. 234 (N. Y. Sup. Ct. igi).
53. 103 Misc. 500, 17o N. Y. Supp. 407 (Sup. Ct. 1918).
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It should be pointed out that whatever benefits may come of the new
Pennsylvania act can scarcely be credited to the legislature which passed it.
Political timidity seems clearly responsible for the lack of opposition;
although only a single vote was cast against the bill, there was a frantic effort,
just too late, to recall it before the Governor signed.5
The social advisability of civil rights legislation is the most controversial phase of the whole matter. The reported cases do not, of course, give
an adequate picture of the practical consequences of the statutes, and it is to
those consequences rather than to legalistic problems, that greatest importance attaches. Over a long period of time, it is likely that the acts will
contribute in some measure to removing the barriers of race prejudice, and
to that extent they may be regarded as desirable. Beyond that, little can
profitably be said except that there is a delicate problem of conflicting interests. Against the fairly obvious interest of the colored race in a more equal
standing in the community, stands the interest of some whites in being free
from what is to them distasteful contact with negroes in places of amusement. Perhaps more substantial opposition to the case for the negro is to
be found in the alleged financial detriment to proprietors within the scope of
the acts. This factor loses much of its magnitude when it is recalled that
the acts apply to the competitors of any given proprietor, as well as to him.
There is, to be sure, a possibility of definite harm to any enterprise on which
belligerent colored organizations might decide to "gang up" by sending
there an abnormal amount of colored trade. But no instances of anything
of this sort have been reported in the public press, and it seems reasonable
to suppose that such measures will not be instituted. Moderation on both
sides is necessary if the application of such legislation is to be in any sense
successful.
L.M. G.
54. See TIME, August 12, 1935, at 10.

